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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-2318
                        
HERMANTO HALIM,
                                        Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                      Respondent                                        
                                               
                         
Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A78-602-265)
Immigration Judge: Donald Vincent Ferlise
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 5, 2005
Before:  RENDELL FISHER and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 12, 2006)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
2RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Hermanto Halim, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)’s April 13, 2004 decision affirming the denial of
Halim’s application for asylum, withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3), protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)
and voluntary departure.
Halim challenges the BIA’s denial of voluntary departure and withholding of
removal.  We lack jurisdiction to consider the denial of voluntary departure, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but may review the BIA’s decision to deny withholding of removal
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  We will grant the petition for review.
Halim claims that, as a Chinese Christian, he has suffered ethnic and religious
persecution in Indonesia that justifies withholding of removal.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). 
Halim was a supervisor at a saw mill in Indonesia from 1995 to 1998.  He asserts that the
native Indonesian employees that he supervised there did not like him because he was
Chinese and that, after he fired an Indonesian employee that he caught stealing, the former
employee and others attacked and extorted money from him.  In May of 1998, the saw mill
and Halim’s house were burned down in countrywide anti-Chinese riots.  After the 1998
riots, Halim came to the United States for several months.  He returned to Indonesia in
January of 1999, where he set up a storefront business designing and reproducing car
alarms.  In October of 1999, Halim and his store were targeted in a wave of anti-Christian
3and anti-Chinese violence that erupted in the runup to a national election.  Halim returned
to the United States in November of 1999, and filed an application for asylum on
November 24, 2000.  After his application was denied, Halim was served with a Notice to
Appear and placed in removal proceedings.
At a hearing before Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Donald Ferlise, Halim testified about
the incidents at the saw mill and the 1998 riots.  Oddly, the subject of the 1999 riots, which
apparently prompted Halim’s return to the United States, never came up.  Although the
affidavit that Halim attached to his application for asylum and withholding of removal,
which the IJ entered into the record as Exhibit 3, described Halim’s trip to the United
States in 1999, his return to Indonesia and the subsequent riots in detail, Halim’s lawyer
failed to elicit testimony about any of these events.  The government’s cross examination
explored inconsistencies between Halim’s testimony and his affidavit, but it never
mentioned the 1999 riots.
The IJ denied Halim’s application for withholding of removal because he
determined that Halim’s testimony was not credible and, in the alternative, that Halim had
failed to satisfy his burden of proving past persecution.  The IJ’s alternative finding was
based in part on his observation that Halim chose to return to Indonesia in 1999 despite his
alleged persecution in the 1998 riots.  According to the IJ, “[t]his sends a loud message to
the Court that either the testimony was completely fabricated, or that the situation is
nowhere near as bad as the respondent would have the Court to believe, otherwise he
4would not have returned to his native country.”  The BIA adopted and affirmed the
decision of the IJ in accordance with its holding in Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec.
872, 874 (BIA 1994), because it agreed with the IJ “that the respondent failed to establish
a clear probability of persecution in light of the fact that he returned to Indonesia [in
January 1999] and did not testify to any incidents that happened while he was there before
returning to the United States [in November 1999].” 
We review the BIA’s findings of fact for “substantial evidence,” which requires us
to treat such findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  “Thus, the question
whether an agency determination is supported by substantial evidence is the same as the
question whether a reasonable fact finder could make such a determination based upon the
administrative record.”  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  
The BIA concluded that Halim had failed to meet his burden of establishing
persecution solely because it determined, as a matter of fact, that Halim had not presented
any evidence of ethnic or religious persecution that occurred after he returned to Indonesia
in 1999.  This finding is wholly unsupported by the record.  Although Halim did not testify
about the events that prompted his return to the United States, his affidavit provided the
following account of the 1999 riots:
[The mob was] yelling anti Chinese and Christian
slogan such as “kill the Chinese . . . kill the dog . . . kill
the kafir . . . etc” . . . .  Suddenly a group of ten people
were already inside of my store.  They were holding
5steel bars and wooden sticks.  They saw a Cross
hanging on the wall (I always hang a Cross on the wall). 
They grabbed the Cross and broke it into two pieces. 
Then they were scattering apart and took every valuable
thing in my store.  I was trying to stop them, but some
of them were holding me from behind.  They smashed
the window and went to my small office.  They
smashed everything in my office and took whatever
they like.  I heard them screaming for joy, destroying
anything they like, then they would shout some Arabic
verses, which I didn’t understand the meaning.  After
about twenty minutes, the mobs went to my next door, a
grocery store belonged to an old Chinese couple. 
Before they left, suddenly they hit my stomach by using
the steel bar and then they punched my face several
times.  It was so hurt that I fainted in a second.
The IJ, the BIA and even Halim’s own lawyer simply ignored this part of the record. 
Halim’s allegations, while perhaps insufficient to establish a clear probability of past or
future persecution, see Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005), at least offer
some evidence that Halim suffered ethnic and religious persecution after he returned to
Indonesia in 1999.  No reasonable fact finder could conclude otherwise.
Because the factual finding that formed the basis for the BIA’s decision was
unsupported by substantial evidence, we will GRANT Halim’s petition for review.  We
express no opinion, however, as to whether the allegations in Halim’s affidavit support a
finding of past persecution or likelihood of future persecution that qualifies him for
withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  We will VACATE the BIA’s
6decision and leave that determination for the BIA to make in the first instance on remand. 
See INS v. Ventura, 527 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002). 
